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Abstract 
In this study I expose, in part I, the semantic core of the 1 ater 
phi 1 osophy. It emerges as the result of the intersection of two 
extremely powerful analytical confrontations run in tandem by 
Wittgenstein. 
In one he overturns the following fundamental notions (which 
characterise what I style as '!!. priorism'): that the expansion of a rule 
is present in adyance of the rule's use; that logical inference and 
mathematical calculation unpacks, or otherwise brings out, what is 
already there in the given premises or arguments; that meaning and 
necessity are contained in the expression of a rule or command, the 
utterance of a (well-formed) sentence, the coming to hand of a cannonical 
proof or the experience it represents, or in the (intentional) act of 
producing a picture or sign; that something in our brains, our 
physiology, a functional state, a platonic object, a clear and distinct 
idea, stands behind and gives '1 ife' to our creation and reproduction of 
language. 
In the other arm of his fundamental analytical pincer movement, 
Wittgenstein crushes what I style as 'cognitivism'. In philosophy of 
language, the 'cognitivist impulse' manifests as the fundamental idea 
that, somehow, meaning, understanding and modality, proof, and certainty, 
-
are objects of knowledge, or at leasl, functions of!!. theory, a grasp or 
apprehension of which is attributed to the language-user. The epistemic 
relation of theory to use so envisaged ipso facto secures linguistic 
competence. In critically rejecting this semantic Weltanschauung, 
Wittgenstein thus rejects the very idea of any truth-conditiona 1 
treatment of meaning: the dissolution of the cognitivist impulse shows 
that sense and necessity cannot be constituted or reconstructed by or 
from veridical functions; it shows that the True- False logical calculus 
is semantically impotent such that whatever it is that logicians have 
been, and are, doing, it cannot be semantics. 
The way is thus opened to grasp Wittgenstein's crucia 1 insight that 
use, as the moment of making the ~li meaningful, is non-cognitive 
constitutive praxis. This means that taking use seriously-- once we are 
cured of the cognitivist impulse-- in fact requires the rejection of 
verificationism, intuitionism, anti-realism and the attendant idealist 
1 egacy, as well as the eschewing of the poverty of behaviourism and 
empiricistic materialism. The result for philosophy of language is an 
unprecedented semantic- analytical position. It lies in a radical 
anti-E priorist --'rehabilitation' of the concept of analyticity 
combined with the equally radical - non-cognitivist -realisation of 
the determination of sense independentl~ of and prior to truth and 
falsity, facticity and theory, science and reflection. Consequently, 
content-- the 'world' understood by the language-game player-- is an 
achievement of linguistic labour, which labour is directed at (and seeks 
to dominate, master and transform) the pre-linguistic material world. 
The result, in stark contrast to the resistances we address in part II of 
this study, is an anti-metaphysics that is distinctly materialist and 
fundamentally naturalistic, but which, above all, is 'realism without 
empiricism'. 
Notes on Symbols Used in Formalisations 
Due to both logistical and financial restrictions a measure of 
improvisation has been necessary in the production of formalisations in 
this text: 
(II 
v 
A 
constitutes the sign for existential generality 
constitutes the sign for universality 
is the (handwritten) sign for negation 
is the (over-printed) sign for disjunction 
is the (handwritten) sign for conjunction 
stands, in formatlisations, for implication, as does:>. (Both these 
signs are hand-drawn.) In informal contexts however, ~(usually 
with reference to samples) represents (the act of) pointing to, or 
otherwise indicating, the sample/object/paradigm case, etc. 
symbolises intersubstituability, usually in the form of sign-
object, or name- object, intersubstitutability. (This sign is 
handwritten.) 
indicates 'co-extensionality' or 'contingent identity', and is 
handwritten. 
t.fl·¢ and q>are handwritten Greek letters 
With three exceptions, all the diagrams in the text are hand-drawn 
reproductions or originals. 
Co 1 our samp 1 es are intended to represent co 1 our types (~, red, 
black), not particular shades of a colour type. 
